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Digital signatures guarantee the authorship of electronic communications. Currently used “clas-
sical” signature schemes rely on unproven computational assumptions for security, while quantum
signatures rely only on the laws of quantum mechanics to sign a classical message. Previous quantum
signature schemes have used unambiguous quantum measurements. Such measurements, however,
sometimes give no result, reducing the efficiency of the protocol. Here, we instead use heterodyne
detection, which always gives a result, although there is always some uncertainty. We experimen-
tally demonstrate feasibility in a real environment by distributing signature states through a noisy
1.6 km free-space channel. Our results show that continuous-variable heterodyne detection improves
the signature rate for this type of scheme and therefore represents an interesting direction in the
search for practical quantum signature schemes. For transmission values ranging from 100 to 10 %,
but otherwise assuming an ideal implementation with no other imperfections, the signature length
is shorter by a factor of 2 to 10. As compared with previous relevant experimental realisations, the
signature length in this implementation is several orders of magnitude shorter.
Digital signatures [1] are ubiquitous in electronic com-
munication, used in, for example, e-mail and digital
banking. They guarantee the provenance, integrity and
transferability of messages. Currently used classical digi-
tal signature schemes, however, rely on unproven compu-
tational assumptions [2], and may become insecure espe-
cially if quantum computers can be built [3]. Quantum
digital signatures (QDS) [4–10], on the other hand, give
information-theoretic security [7], loosely speaking based
on the fact that non-orthogonal quantum states cannot
be perfectly distinguished from each other.
The first quantum signature schemes assumed tamper-
proof, “authenticated” quantum communication links.
Intuitively, this could be accomplished using parameter
estimation techniques similar to those used in quantum
key distribution (QKD). How to achieve this was explic-
itly shown only recently [10, 11]. In addition, recent
quantum signature schemes [6, 9], including our proto-
col, do not require long-term quantum memory. Im-
portantly, this means that quantum signatures can be
implemented with current technology, essentially simi-
lar to QKD setups. “Classical” signature schemes with
information-theoretic security also exist [12–14], but rely
on secret shared keys, which could be accomplished us-
ing QKD. Quantum signature schemes may have some
advantages over schemes relying on shared keys gener-
ated using QKD. In particular, the quantum bit error
threshold for a signature scheme is in practice less strict
than for distilling a secret shared key [11]. In addition
the required post-processing is less demanding. Exactly
what signature schemes are the most efficient however
remains an open problem.
Note that most QDS protocols, including this one, use
quantum states to sign a classical message. In fact, it is
impossible to sign a quantum message [15] using a non-
arbitrated scheme [16]. Arbitrated signing of quantum
messages has previously been investigated [17–20].
Since messages may be forwarded between recipients, a
signature protocol has at least three parties, a sender Al-
ice and two recipients Bob and Charlie. In QKD, the
communicating parties Alice and Bob are assumed to
be honest. In signature protocols, however, any of the
involved parties could be dishonest. Signature schemes
should be secure against forging (with high probability,
only messages sent by Alice should be accepted) and
against repudiation (it is unlikely that Alice could suc-
cessfully deny having sent a message that she did send).
Repudiation is closely related to message transferability.
Transferability means that it is unlikely that one recipi-
ent accepts a message as genuine, but that this message
then is rejected if it is forwarded to another recipient.
If there is no trusted third party, one way to settle dis-
putes is by majority voting. For three parties, which is
the case we will consider, non-repudiation and message
transferability then become equivalent.
In principle, quantum signature schemes are based on
a “quantum one-way function” which maps classical in-
formation (a “private key”) to non-orthogonal quantum
states (a “public key”) [7]. In the simplest case, Alice
wants to be able to later on send a one-bit message “0”
2or “1”. For longer messages, the scheme could be suitably
iterated. Generically, signature schemes have a distribu-
tion stage, where the scheme is set up, and a messaging
stage, when messages are sent and received. The distri-
bution stage could be compared to leaving a sample of
a handwritten signature e.g. when first opening a bank
account. The messaging stage typically takes place much
later. In our quantum signature scheme, the messaging
stage is entirely “classical”.
In the distribution stage, Alice selects sequences of
quantum states, one sequence for each possible future
message “0” and “1”. The states in the sequences are se-
lected from some set of non-orthogonal quantum states.
The classical information about what states Alice has se-
lected forms her “private keys” for the possible messages
“0” or “1”. The quantum state sequences are the corre-
sponding “public keys”. Alice then sends copies of the
“public key” sequences to Bob and Charlie, who mea-
sure the states they receive. Since it is impossible to per-
fectly discriminate non-orthogonal quantum states, Bob
and Charlie, or any other party, can never obtain full
information about Alice’s “private keys”.
Later on, in the messaging stage, when Alice wants to
send a message to Bob or Charlie, she sends the mes-
sage together with the corresponding “private key”. The
recipient of a message checks that the appended private
key sufficiently well matches the measurement results he
obtained in the distribution stage for the respective mes-
sage. In a real implementation, there will be mismatches
even for a private key sent by an honest Alice. However,
if imperfections are not too high, then anyone other than
Alice would cause a higher level of mismatches than Al-
ice. This guarantees security against message forging.
Similarly, to forward a message, a recipient forwards
the message together with its private key, received from
Alice, and the new recipient checks for mismatches with
his measurement record. Related to this, Bob and Char-
lie also need to ensure that Alice cannot cheat, which
would mean that she could make them disagree about
the validity of a message. They achieve this by some
kind of symmetrization procedure, done in the distribu-
tion stage [7, 8, 21]. In our protocol, as in [21], Bob and
Charlie randomly forward half of their obtained measure-
ment results to each other using a classical communica-
tion channel, secret from Alice. This channel could be
realized using standard quantum key distribution. To
ensure that Alice is unlikely to make Bob and Charlie
disagree about the validity of a signature, the thresh-
old for accepting a message directly from Alice should
be stricter than for accepting a forwarded message. For
more details see [22].
In this paper, we implement a quantum signa-
ture scheme using continuous variable (CV) heterodyne
quantum measurements. Previous quantum signature
schemes [5, 6, 23] have instead used unambiguous quan-
tum measurements. We demonstrate that our scheme is
viable in a noisy environment using a free-space urban
optical communication link. Finally, we show that, even
FIG. 1: Depiction of the scheme. The numbered parts re-
late to the corresponding stages in the main text. Green
dashed lines indicate classical communication. Red lines in-
dicate communication with quantum states.
when experimental imperfections are taken into account,
this scheme outperforms a recent scheme that uses un-
ambiguous state elimination measurements [23].
Our QDS scheme is represented in Fig. 1, with the
protocol described below. The stages in the text corre-
spond to the respective numbers in the figure. We use
a discrete set of CV states, four phase-encoded coher-
ent states |α〉, |iα〉, | − α〉, | − iα〉, and heterodyne CV
measurements [24]. The same states were also used in
previous QDS schemes [5, 6, 23] and are similar to those
used in some types of CV QKD [25, 26]. In [5, 6, 23], how-
ever, recipients made “discrete” quantum measurements
with error-free (unambiguous) results, at the expense of
sometimes obtaining no result. Here we instead perform
heterodyne measurements, which always give a result, at
the expense of increased errors in the results. In many
cases, unambiguous results are required for a protocol to
perform efficiently [27, 28]. Surprisingly, we find that for
this particular QDS protocol, heterodyne measurements
provide an advantage.
Distribution stage: 1-4
1. For each possible future one-bit message k = 0, 1, Al-
ice generates two identical copies of sequences of phase-
encoded coherent states, QuantSigk = ⊗Ll=1|ψkl 〉〈ψkl |,
where |ψkl 〉 is a randomly chosen phase-encoded coher-
ent state, |ψkl 〉 = |αeiφ
k
l 〉, φkl ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}, and
L is a suitably chosen integer. The state QuantSigk is
called the quantum signature, and the sequence of phases
PrivKeyk = (φ
k
1 , ...φ
k
L) is called the private key.
2. Alice sends one copy of QuantSigk to Bob and one to
Charlie, for each possible message k = 0 and k = 1.
3. Bob (Charlie) measures the states received from Alice
by performing a heterodyne detection [24, 29] of the xˆ-
and pˆ-quadrature. He records the result of the measure-
ment and the associated position in the sequence l. For
each quadrature, the sign of the measured result deter-
mines which state is eliminated. For example if a positive
result is measured, then the state |−α〉 or |− iα〉 is elim-
inated, depending on the measured quadrature. In this
3way, Bob (Charlie) eliminates two states, one for each
quadrature, for each signature element.
4. Symmetrization: Bob (Charlie), for each element l of
QuantSigk, randomly chooses with equal probability to
either forward the measurement results and position to
Charlie (Bob) or not, secret from Alice, who should not
learn the positions of the forwarded results. The resulting
sequences of measurement outcomes, after the forwarding
procedure, form Bob’s and Charlie’s “eliminated signa-
tures”. Bob (Charlie) keeps the results obtained directly
from Alice, and the results forwarded to him by Charlie
(Bob) separate. Therefore, he has an eliminated signa-
ture in two parts, each of length L/2.
Heterodyne measurements will, even in the ideal case,
sometimes eliminate the sent state. If everybody fol-
lows the protocol, the probability for this depends on
the overlap of the coherent states, and would be equal
to 12erfc
(
α/
√
2
)
in the ideal case with no loss or exper-
imental imperfections, where erfc(x) is the complemen-
tary error function. For α = 0, this probability equals one
half, and quickly approaches zero as α increases. Due to
the unavoidable errors, this measurement protocol is an
example of “ambiguous state elimination”. Since mea-
surements are performed immediately on receipt of the
states, no quantum memory is required, just as in [6, 9].
Messaging stage: 5-7
5. To send a signed one-bit message m, Alice sends
(m,PrivKeym) to Bob.
6. Bob checks whether (m,PrivKeym) matches both
parts of his stored eliminated signature by counting how
many elements of Alice’s private key were eliminated dur-
ing the distribution stage. If there are fewer than saL/2
mismatches in each of the two parts of his eliminated
signature, where sa is the authentication threshold, Bob
accepts the message.
7. If Bob wishes to forward a message, he forwards the
message and its corresponding private key. Charlie tests
for mismatches in the same way as Bob, but with a higher
verification threshold sv, to protect against repudiation.
Charlie accepts the message if there are fewer than svL/2
mismatches in each of the two parts of his eliminated
signature, with perr < sa < sv <
1
2 .
In essence, the security of this scheme comes from two
sources. First, it is impossible for a forger to perfectly
determine the private key, since the used quantum states
are non-orthogonal. If noise is sufficiently low, the dis-
tributor Alice has an advantage over any other party.
Second, the forwarding of measurement results ensures
that, from Alice’s point of view, Bob’s and Charlie’s mea-
surement records follow the same statistics. This means
that if Charlie uses a higher verification threshold sv than
Bob’s authentication threshold sa, then Alice’s probabil-
ity to repudiate can be made arbitrarily small by choosing
the signature length L large enough. An upper bound on
the repudiation probability is calculated using the Ho-
effding inequality [30] in the supplemental material [22].
Security against collective attacks follows from the fact
that different signature states are completely uncorre-
FIG. 2: Signature length for α = 0.48. Blue curve: theoret-
ical model. Blue dots/bars: results from the data attributed
to Bob. Red triangles/bars: results from the data attributed
to Charlie. The error bars calculated are derived by inves-
tigating the standard deviation of ten subsets of the entire
dataset. The errors naturally increase with decreasing trans-
mission since g from Eq. (1) decreases. In addition, less data
was available at lower transmission values (see histogram of
signals received by Bob per transmission sub-channel as in-
set). The data used for each point comes from a small range
of transmissions, but horizontal error bars are omitted for
clarity.
lated, meaning that the optimal collective attack is an
individual attack on each signature element [6]. Secu-
rity against coherent attacks is left for future work, not-
ing that due to the forwarding of measurement results
amongst other things [31], methods from the security of
QKD cannot be directly carried over. Security against
coherent attacks has nevertheless been analysed for a
related quantum signature protocol [11, 21]. We also
assume that there are authenticated quantum channels
between Alice, Bob and Charlie. Some kind of parame-
ter estimation procedure should be used to replace this
assumption, analogous to [10, 11].
To successfully forge, Bob must guess a sequence of
states that meets Charlie’s verification threshold. For
individual and collective forging, the optimal forging at-
tack is to perform a minimum-cost measurement on the
individual signature states [31]. The minimum cost Cmin
is the minimum probability that an honest party will de-
tect an error in an individual signature element coming
from the forger, and is calculated in the supplemental
material [22]. As long as Cmin is larger than perr, which
denotes the probability of a mismatch with the sent sig-
nature when all parties are honest, the signature scheme
can be made secure by appropriately choosing other pro-
tocol parameters such as the length L. Note that perr
is determined from experimental data. A final condition
for a useful QDS scheme is that it must be robust, i.e.
it must succeed with high probability if all parties are
honest.
The exact security definitions can vary and depend on
whether one party is more likely to be dishonest than the
others. As detailed in the supplemental material [22], we
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FIG. 3: Black (solid) curve: Signature length for an ideal am-
biguous measurement scheme. Red (dotted) curve: Signature
length for an ambiguous measurement scheme with realistic
imperfections. Blue (dot-dashed) curve: Signature length for
an ideal unambiguous measurement scheme.
set protocol parameters so that the repudiation probabil-
ity, the forging probability and the failure probability are
all approximately equal. In this way, the probability that
the scheme will fail in any one of these ways is bounded
by
P (failure) ≤ 2 exp
(
−g
2
16
L
)
, (1)
where g = Cmin − perr is the advantage that the legiti-
mate sender Alice has over a forger for a single position
of the signature sequence [22, 23]. Since the failure prob-
ability decays exponentially with the signature length L,
the scheme is secure, and any required security level can
be achieved with sufficiently large L. The figure of merit
we use to characterise the quality of our QDS schemes is
the length 2L required to sign a one-bit message with a
failure probability of 0.01 %.
To show the robustness of the protocol, the experiment
was carried out over a real free-space urban link [32, 33].
The signal states |±α〉, |±iα〉 were then repeatedly trans-
mitted, polarization multiplexed with the local oscilla-
tor, which is needed for later detection, through a free-
space channel between the buildings of the Max Planck
Institute and the University of Erlangen-Nu¨rnberg [32–
34]. The length of the channel is approximately 1.6 km.
The channel transmission fluctuated between 50 % and
85 % due to beam wandering and scintillation. At the
receiver the signal was split on a balanced beam splitter
to measure both the xˆ and pˆ quadratures. Simultane-
ously, the transmission was recorded for each state (for
more details see [22]). The experiment was implemented
for three different signal amplitudes, α = 0.48, α = 0.93,
and α = 1.63, and we attribute the first (second) half
of the measurement time to Bob (Charlie). To remedy
the channel fading, Bob’s (Charlie’s) measurement data
is then sorted into 32 sub-channels according to the mea-
sured transmission [32, 33]. Depending on the sign of
the quadrature measurement values, for each signal state,
two of the possible sent states were eliminated.
For each set of data, the sequence of eliminated states
was used to produce a cost matrix [31] that gives the
probability that each state was eliminated for a particu-
lar signal state. For each cost matrix, we calculate the
minimum difference between an off-diagonal element of
the cost matrix (probability of eliminating a state that
was not sent) and the diagonal element of that row (prob-
ability of eliminating the sent state). This difference was
multiplied by the appropriate pmin to obtain the param-
eter g from (1) for that cost matrix. The minimum prob-
ability that a forger will incorrectly identify the state is
pmin (see [22]). For each g, the signature length 2L to
sign a one-bit message with a failure probability of 0.01 %
was calculated. In Fig. 2, the length L is plotted against
transmission T with T+R=1 for α = 0.48.
To account for experimental imperfections, a theoreti-
cal model was developed, using only experimental data,
with no free parameters (for details see the supplemen-
tal material [22]). The larger errors bars in Fig. 2 are
mostly due to the statistical error of the smaller amount
of data available at lower transmission. The experiment
has a clock rate of about 2.2 MHz and the required signa-
ture length of about 105 is easily manageable in the sub-
channels; thus this demonstrates a viable QDS scheme.
The experiment was also carried out at α = 0.93 and
α = 1.63 (results given in [22]). Increasing α improves
the cost matrix but also decreases pmin, which makes the
guess of the forger easier. There is a trade-off between
these two effects, with the optimal α predicted to be α ≈
0.5, supported by the experimental results.
The main purpose of this experiment is as a test of the
measurement procedure used. A calculation of the cost
matrix provides all the information relevant for imple-
menting a full scheme. In the experiment, all the quan-
tum steps were carried out; the rest is classical commu-
nication and information processing. The experiment is
also the first to demonstrate a signature scheme in a free-
space setting, in contrast to previous experiments using
optical fibers.
It is important to compare the performance of this
scheme to previous results. In [23], a similar scheme
is presented, but with unambiguous state elimination
rather than the “continuous-variable ambiguous state
elimination” used here. There, the signature length re-
quired was about 109, for 500 m of optical fiber and a
total loss level of 35 %. Comparing this to our results,
the signature length was about 7×104 with a similar loss
level and a 1.6 km free-space channel. In [23], the exper-
iment ran at a clock rate of 100 MHz, whereas the clock
rate of this experiment was 2.2 MHz. Increasing the clock
rate into the GHz range is straightforward with available
technology and the authors have recently demonstrated a
continuous-variable system, capable of distributing quan-
tum states at GHz rates [37].
Fig. 3 shows the dependence of signature lengths from
transmission for the two schemes (details of the mod-
els given in [22]). Even including experimental errors,
5our scheme requires a shorter signature than the ideal
result for [23]. That is, the QDS protocol based on am-
biguous state elimination has a fundamental advantage
over unambiguous state elimination. This advantage is
even more pronounced when experimental inefficiencies
are taken into account. Approximately one order of mag-
nitude of the advantage comes purely from the chosen
measurement, as shown in Fig. 3. The rest comes from
the improved technical performance of heterodyne mea-
surements compared to single-photon detectors. Notably,
heterodyne detection is more compatible with modern
telecommunication networks, than single photon detec-
tion, furthering its appeal and holding a promise to move
to GHz rates and higher transmission ranges. The im-
provement in signature length is the greatest, a factor of
10 shorter, for a transmission of 10 %. This indicates that
heterodyne measurements may be more robust against
losses.
In conclusion, we have presented a QDS scheme that
uses heterodyne measurements. We have experimentally
demonstrated that the scheme works over a fluctuating
free-space channel, which is the first free-space realiza-
tion for quantum signatures. In addition, the signature
rate per quantum state sent is orders of magnitude better
than in previous comparable work. Heterodyne detection
used for ambiguous state elimination gives a result for
each sent state. Interestingly, this overcompensates the
increased error probability and leads to an overall better
performance compared to unambiguous measurements.
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